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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to see if an equilibrium model of compensating differences for 
amenities can be applied to a major transition economy, Russia.  We analyze Russian labor and 
housing markets using data from the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) augmented 
by city and regional-specific characteristics from other sources.  Our estimated wage and housing 
value equations suggest that workers are compensated for differences in climate, environmental 
conditions, ethnic conflicts, crime rates, and health conditions, after controlling for worker 
characteristics, occupation, industry, and economic conditions, and various housing 
characteristics.  We find evidence that these compensating differentials exist even after controlling 
for the regional pay differences (“regional coefficients”) used by the Russian government to 
compensate public sector workers for living in regions that are designated as less desirable.  
Quality of life, as measured by a group of eleven amenities, varies substantially.  The highest 
ranked cities tend to be in relatively warm areas and areas in the western, European part of the 
country.  Our quality of life index is positively correlated with net migration into a region, 
suggesting workers are attracted to amenity-rich locations.  Overall, we find that a model of 
compensating differentials with controls for disequilibrium yields useful information about 
compensation for location-specific amenities and quality of life in this large transition economy. 
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1. Introduction  
Market economies tend to generate compensating differentials in housing and labor 
markets for location specific amenities.  These local amenities include climate, which is natural, 
urban conditions, which are produced, and environmental quality, which is partly natural and 
partly produced.  In markets that are functioning smoothly, compensating differentials are a basic 
tool for understanding the consequences of movements of people and businesses across regions 
and cities.  Compensating differentials are also used to estimate the values people place on goods 
that are not typically sold in markets and to measure quality of life across geographic locations.  In 
Western economies such as in the United States, there have been several studies that estimate 
compensating differentials in labor and housing markets and which rank areas by quality of life 
and many more related studies.  The review of this literature by Gyourko, Kahn, and Tracy [23] 
offers a critical synthesis of more than 70 books, articles, and papers. 
A related and potentially important use of the estimates of the values of amenities is as 
shadow prices for amenities that are not typically included in national income accounts.  
Construction of an index that is more comprehensive than Net National Product, such as Nordhaus 
and Tobin’ [36] Measure of Economic Welfare, requires monetary values of the nonmarket goods 
and services.  Green accounting requires monetary values of measures of environmental and 
natural resource services.1  Considerable interest in green accounting exists in the U.S. and, in fact, 
around the world; see Nordhaus [35] and Heal and Kriström [26].  If compensating differentials 
can be estimated for emerging markets, the prospect for successful implementation of green 
accounting is more promising for more of the world.  In order to use a compensating differentials 
approach, equilibrium must exist whether or not the economy is in transition.   
                                                          
1 As discussed in Heal and Kriström [26] other approaches such as defensive expenditures and politically determined 
willingness to pay are candidates for estimating the monetary values of amenities.  Stated preference approaches can 
be used to estimate the value of amenities.  Hoehn and Randall [27] provide a state of the art example and Carson [10] 
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 Compensating differentials represent an equilibrium adjustment mechanism in housing and 
labor markets that matches consumers/workers and firms with different preferences and 
production technologies.  Even in a mature, market economy such as in the U. S. one might be 
skeptical of the usefulness of this equilibrium model.  A major study by Greenwood, Hunt, 
Rickman, and Treyz [22] tests for spatial equilibrium.  They estimate an equilibrium relative 
income at which no net migration would occur.  By comparing the actual income to the estimated 
equilibrium income for each area, they find little evidence of disequilibrium for the period 1971-
1988 in the U.S.  They find that classification of areas that are amenity-rich and amenity-poor and 
comparing them with estimates from quality of life index values from the Blomquist, Berger, and 
Hoehn [6] study yields only minor classification differences.  Gyourko, Kahn, and Tracy [23] 
provide a reminder of the crucial nature of this underlying equilibrium assumption of the 
compensating differentials framework.   
Surely any concern about equilibrium is magnified if a compensating differentials 
framework is applied to an economy making a transition from central government planning to a 
decentralized market system.  The basic question is whether or not compensating differentials are 
generated in a transition economy, and if they are what this implies about geographic variation in 
quality of life.2  Are the market forces strong enough to produce observable wage and housing 
price differences across regions that are related to differences in location specific amenities?  The 
purpose of this paper is to see if an equilibrium model of compensating differences for amenities 
can be applied to a major transition economy, Russia.  The goal is to estimate wage and housing 
hedonic equations, amenity values, and a quality of life index to see if reasonable results emerge.  
                                                                                                                                                                                              
provides an overview of contingent valuation.  An alternative approach would be to make inferences from extended 
surveys of happiness that have been applied to macroeconomic conditions, see di Tella, MacCulloch and Oswald [13]. 
2Total utility for individuals is comprehensive and depends on at least the consumption of marketed goods and 
services, goods produced within the household, as well as the bundle amenities that is available in the areas where the 
individuals live and work.  Quality of life, as defined in this paper in equation 5 below, is the value to households of a 
bundle of amenities in an area, not a measure of total utility. 
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To our knowledge no one has attempted a systematic analysis of compensating differentials for 
location specific amenities for a transition economy. 
Few would question the challenge given the change in Russia induced by the transition that 
began more than a decade ago.  Fischer and Sahay [15] describe Russia’s promising start with 
privatization and stabilization in the early and mid 1990s.  However, this period was followed by 
fiscal problems that resulted in financial collapse in 1998 and the lowest level of output since the 
transition began.  The ratio of real Gross Domestic Product in 1999 to that in 1989 was only 0.59; 
see Fischer and Sahay [15, p.3].  Adjustments in the labor and housing markets are not likely to be 
smooth and quick.   
Among transition economies, Russia offers a unique opportunity to examine compensation 
for location-specific amenities.  The Russian Federation and its 89 oblasts, republics, and krays, or 
regions, stretch across 11 time zones.  Important for our analysis is the fact that there is wide 
variation in the distribution of amenities across regions.  For example, for cities the number of 
registered crimes per 1,000 population has a mean of 23.9 with a standard deviation of 15.4 and a 
range from 1.7 to 210.9.  This kind of variation allows us to examine any wage and housing price 
differences, holding constant nonamenity factors affecting wages and housing prices.  Existence of 
compensating differentials allows valuation of quality of life in Russian cities as well as 
estimation the amount of influence of central government planners through “regional coefficients” 
they used to adjust wages. 
2. An Equilibrium Model of Wages, Rents, and Amenities 
The fundamental framework for analyzing compensating differentials and quality of life 
was developed by Rosen [39] and Roback [38].  In this framework consumers/workers with 
similar preferences and firms with similar production technologies face different location specific 
amenity bundles across geographic areas.  In spatial equilibrium, so that there is no incentive to 
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move, differences in wages and/or housing prices develop to require payments for locating in 
amenity rich areas and provide compensation for locating in amenity poor areas.  Applications 
with heterogeneous individuals have led to including nonlocation characteristics of workers and 
houses as control variables.  The full implicit price of a specified amenity is the sum of the 
housing price differential and the negative of the wage differential.  In Blomquist, Berger, and 
Hoehn [6], we expand this framework to incorporate agglomeration effects and use this form of 
the implicit price of amenities.  We find capitalization of the value of local amenities into local 
labor markets and housing markets.  
In this paper we analyze cities.  As in Blomquist, Berger, and Hoehn [6], households 
derive utility from consumption of a composite good, local housing, and local amenities.  A 
household gets access to the amenities of the kth city through purchase of housing hk in that city, 
where k = 1 … n and n is the number of cities.  Both the composite good and housing are 
purchased out of labor earnings.  Households are endowed with one unit of labor each that they 
sell to local firms and earn a wage wk.  All income is labor income and labor is homogeneous.  In 
city k, household well-being is 
vk =  vk (wk; pk; ak), (1) 
where vk(.) is the indirect utility function, pk is the price of housing in city k, and ak is an index of 
local amenities.  The price of the composite good is fixed and suppressed.  Wages increase utility, 
∂vk/∂wk >0, and the price of housing decreases utility, ∂vk/∂pk <0.  An increase in the amenity 
index will increase utility if a is an amenity for consumer/workers, ∂vk/∂ak >0, decrease utility if a 
is a disamenity for consumer/workers, ∂vk/∂ak <0, and have no effect on utility if a is not an 
amenity factor.   
 Firms produce the composite good by combining capital and local labor and production 
technology is constant returns to scale.  Let the prices of the composite good and capital be fixed 
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by international markets, and further let the wages and prices be normalized on the price of the 
composite good.  Set the price of the composite good equal to one.  In city k, unit production costs 
are  
ck = ck (wk; a k,, N), (2) 
where ck is the unit cost function for a firm and the price of capital is left implicit.  N is city 
population and is determined by the fixed amount of land in the city divided by residential demand 
for land.  By Sheppard’s lemma a firm’s demand for labor is ∂ck/∂wk >0.  If a is a production 
amenity, then costs are lower, ∂ck/∂ak <0.  If a is a production disamenity, then costs are higher, 
∂ck/∂ak >0.  Costs are unaffected if a is not a production amenity factor.3  Because we do not 
observe urban sub-areas, we do not consider variation of amenities within a city or agglomeration 
which affects all jurisdictions within an urban area.  Our model does not include land prices 
because the land market did not develop in Russia until 2000.4 
 Equilibrium results from sufficient movement of households and firms among cities so that 
wages and housing prices clear the labor and housing markets.  Spatial equilibrium implies that 
households in all cities experience a common level of utility, u0, and unit production costs are 
equal to the unit production price.  For any city, the set of wages and housing prices that sustains 
an equilibrium satisfies the system of equations 
u0 = vk (wk; pk; ak); (3a) 
1 = ck (wk; ak, N) (3b) 
                                                          
3 An amenity factor can affect both households and firms, and production amenities can be important.  Beeson and 
Eberts [4] found that approximately 60 percent of the wage differential that compensates for amenity differences in 
the U.S. was due to productivity (firm amenity) differences. 
4 There was practically no market and pricing of the land that a firm could buy until 2000.  By the end of 2000, less 
than 1 percent of all land in Russian settlements was property of legal entities (enterprises).  By July 2002, the share of 
privatized urban land was negligible.  St. Petersburg city had the largest share of privatized urban land among all 
cities; it was only 1.4 percent.  The share in other cities for which data was reported ranged from 0 to 0.2 percent.  
Until 2002 land privatization was prohibited in Moscow.  See Khakhalin [29]. 
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and the condition that requires the population of the nation to equal the sum of the city 
populations.  Equilibrium differentials for wages and housing prices can be used to compute 
implicit prices of the amenities, fk.  By taking the total differential of equation 3a and rearranging, 
the implicit price of an amenity can be found, fk = (∂vk/∂ak) / (∂vk/∂wk).  For amenity ak the full 
implicit price is 
fk =   hk (dpk/dak) ‒ dwk/dak, (4) 
where hk is the quantity of housing purchased by a household in city k, (dpk/dak) is the equilibrium 
housing price differential and (dwk/dak) is the equilibrium wage differential.  The full implicit 
price is combination of the effect in the housing market and the effect in the labor market.  
Comparative static analysis of such a model shows that the signs of the housing price and wage 
differentials depend on the effect of the amenity factor on households and the effect of the amenity 
factor on firms.  A pure consumption amenity, that does not have an effect on firms, is expected to 
have a full implicit price that is positive.  It is the weighted sum of the differentials in the housing 
market and labor market that is expected to be positive.  It is not necessary that both the housing 
prices are higher and the wages are lower in cities that are rich in the consumption amenity.  As a 
practical matter, the amenities factors which we use might affect consumers/workers and firms.  
For example, the area crime rate can be a disamenity to both residents and firms in the city. 
The quality of life index (QOLI) for any city k is  
QOLIk =  Σi fi aki                  k = 1, …, N. (5) 
QOLI is the sum of the endowments of the i amenities in city k of N cities where each amenity is 
weighted by its estimated full implicit price based on the wage and housing price differentials.  As 
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such, the QOLI is an estimate of the total compensation or payments for the amenities in city k 
made through the housing and labor markets.5,6 
3.  Compensating Differentials under Plan and Market 
Although the equilibrium assumptions of the model may make one wonder about how 
appropriate this framework is for a transition economy, the concept of compensating differentials 
is not a foreign concept in Russia.  Compensating differentials existed under socialism even 
though wages and housing prices were not determined by market forces.  In any society, people 
care about income and housing and have preferences for cities that are rich in amenities.  
Government planners have faced these individual preferences and have responded by offering 
inducements for working in less desirable areas.  Soviet policy included the “efficient and socially 
necessary” allocation of labor across regions.  The goal of that policy was attracting workers to 
locations with unfavorable climate and environment.  Soviet channels of worker reallocation 
involved planned distribution of graduates, organized recruitments to the “bad” regions, housing 
subsidies, paid moving expenses and other government actions.  One of the most important tools 
of the worker relocation policy was regional wage coefficients (multiples of the base salary) that 
provided different levels of compensation for workers depending on the location of their job. 
                                                          
5 For small variations in the typical amenity bundle the difference in the QOLI index approximates the value 
households place on the amenities.  Tim Bartik has suggested an alternative to the Rosen, linearized approach that is 
used in this paper.  The alternative would measure the combined wage and housing price differential associated with 
the change in amenities city to city using the wage and housing hedonic functions.  Values from such a nonlinear 
index would be more closely related to willingness to pay suitable for benefit cost analysis.  He also suggests that this 
alternative may not yield greatly different values for amenity bundles given the semilog specification we use in 
estimation of the wage and housing equations. 
6 This compensation or payment may not equal willingness to pay for the typical household if there is heterogeneity 
across households in tastes for amenities.  This can happen if households self select into cities based on unobservable 
preference characteristics.  Households that fear crime less or can better protect themselves against crime will sort into 
higher crime cities and will have a relatively low value of lower crime rates.  Chay and Greenstone [11] and Bajari 
and Kahn [2] demonstrate that this sorting can bias estimates of willingness to pay.  This effect may not be as great in 
Russia because sorting is not as complete as in the U.S.  
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The Soviet housing system was also highly distorted by administrative regulations and 
suffered from chronic shortages, long waiting lists, subsidies and undefined property rights in the 
absence of free housing market.  Housing was part of in-kind worker compensation provided by 
state-owned enterprises and government agencies.  However, there are some indications that the 
laws of supply and demand have played a role in the allocation of housing even under central 
planning.  Although there was no a regular (money based) housing market, it was possible to 
exchange apartments through barter, and apartments had their shadow prices.  For example, 
newspapers displayed advertisements offering exchanges.  A 3-room apartment in a small Siberian 
city might be offered for a 1-room apartment in the southern city of Sochi or a 1-room apartment 
might be offered for a car and a garden plot.  Implicit (shadow) housing prices reflected 
compensating differentials.  However, these compensating differentials were likely to be 
compressed due to residence permits (propiska) and other administrative measures that prevented 
people from moving freely.  The system of propiska was extensively used as an instrument of 
spatial planning and population allocation policy.  As the transition started, the system was 
abolished, but it is still an issue in two major cities, Moscow and St. Petersburg, that we will 
consider separately. 
The modern Russian housing market began in 1991 with the Soviet Law on Privatization 
on Housing that allowed for free market trade of houses and established private property rights.  
The privatization process was slow and, according to the statistical yearbook Goskomstat [21], by 
the end of 2000 only 47 percent of all housing stock had been privatized.  Housing privatization 
was fulfilled as a free distribution of existing units to residing tenants.  Privatization was made 
voluntary and tenants received an opportunity to privatize their housing for free.  Before and after 
housing privatization, households did not have any rent obligations and paid the same amount of 
money for repair, maintenance, and utilities regardless of whether they privatized housing or not.  
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There were no real incentives to privatize housing unless households were planning to move and 
sell their units.  Housing privatization has been hindered because ownership of a residence may 
not include ownership of the land on which it stands. 
As of 2000, the Russian housing market remained less developed and the transactions costs 
associated with housing purchases and housing exchanges between cities are still high.  However, 
there is some evidence that even in this environment, compensating differentials for location-
specific amenities can develop.  Kolstad, Gorbacheva, Khaleeva, and Shcherbich [31] use data on 
apartment rents in Moscow, one of the few places where rent data are available, and find that 
environmental quality is associated with higher rents holding constant the characteristics of the 
apartment.  We will also show that hedonic functions can produce the sensible estimates of 
compensating differentials and amenity prices 8 years after the beginning of market reforms.   
While applying the general compensating differentials framework to Russia, we need to 
consider several peculiar characteristics of Russian markets and regulations.  One of them is the 
system of government regional wage coefficients that Russia has kept for public workers.  These 
regional wage coefficients provide different levels of compensation for government workers 
depending on the location of the job.  They are not explicitly for cost of living differences, but 
rather for quality of life differences.  As can be seen from Figure 1 that shows the coefficients by 
region for the year 2000, the compensation for public workers is greater for areas to the north and 
to the east in Russia where climate is harsher.  The value of the regional wage coefficient ranges 
from 1.0 (base wage and no extra compensation) in central Russia to 3.0 (triple the base wage) in 
Siberian Chukotka, in northeastern Russia near the Bering Straight. 
The fact that compensation for working in areas that are amenity poor has existed for some 
time makes it more likely that Russian markets generate compensating differentials.  Markets will 
not be limited to climate differences, however, but will consider whatever consumers/workers and 
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firms deem important.  The presence of government wage coefficients does not change the theory, 
but we can test to see if their presence has any impact on wages and housing prices.  We can see if 
compensation exists for amenities even after controlling for the regional wage coefficients.  In 
addition, we can examine whether the regional wage coefficients are related to just climate or also 
to any other amenity variables.  Finally, we will be able to compare quality of life rankings that 
emerge from our market analysis based on compensating differentials with rankings implicit in the 
government’s policy tool, the regional wage coefficients. 
When wages and housing prices are freed, observable compensating differentials would be 
expected to increase and reflect other amenities not reflected in the administratively set regional 
wage coefficients.  The liberalization of labor and housing markets would also increase the 
variance in the quality of life index across cities and create incentives for people to begin 
migrating to higher amenity cities.  As market development progresses, the differentials and the 
variance will eventually decrease. 
In addition to government compensation policies, several other peculiar Russian features 
should also be taken into account when estimating the standard model of compensating 
differentials.  Among them are economic volatility (disequilibrium forces), remaining system of 
residence permits in two largest cities, the low rents-to-housing-value ratio that affects the interest 
rate, the importance of ethnic conflicts as disamenity, some data problems and other features that 
will be addressed in the next sections.   
4. Data and Variables 
For the purpose of this study, several data sources are combined into unique linked city-
household-employee data that contain detailed information on workers, houses, and city 
characteristics.  The primary data for this study are drawn from the 9th round of the Russian 
Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS).  The RLMS is a household panel survey based on the 
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first national probability sample drawn in the Russian Federation.  Rounds 1 through 4 were 
conducted in 1992 and 1993 using a sample of over ten thousand individuals (Phase I).  A new 
sample (Phase II) was drawn for Round 5 in 1994.  This second sample was used subsequently in 
1995, 1996, 1998 and 2000-2005.    
Questions on individual housing prices were added to the survey beginning with the 9th 
round of the RLMS conducted between October and December 2000, which is the last year that 
could be linked to the available city-level data.  Therefore, we can use only Round 9 of the RLMS 
in the estimation of our wage and hedonic models and identify implicit amenity prices using inter-
city variation in the RLMS.7  There were 9,704 individuals who completed the adult (age 14 and 
over) questionnaire in the 9th round.  These individuals come from 39 cities and 119 rural 
settlements in 32 different oblasts, or regions, in the Russian Federation.  The number of 
employed (employees and self employed) workers residing in urban areas was 3,280.  We base our 
wage analysis on a sample of 3,017 urban workers in the 9th round who have complete information 
on wages, hours worked, demographic characteristics, occupation, and industry.  We base our 
housing value analysis on a sample of 2,231 households living in cities.  
The RLMS provides several individual characteristics such as gender, years of schooling, 
actual labor market experience, job tenure, marital status, usual monthly hours of work, and 
average monthly wages.  Based on information provided by most working respondents on their 
job, we were also able to get detailed occupation and industry codes.  Data quality can be a 
                                                          
7 While we cannot use panel estimation in the housing equation estimation using the RLMS, we could use panel data 
for the estimation of the wage equation prior to 2000.  We choose not to use data from multiple years to exploit the 
panel nature of the data for several reasons.  First, prices of amenities may be changing over time and it would be 
difficult to properly account for this in a short panel.  Further, if one wanted to do fixed-effect estimation to control for 
person specific fixed effects, the variation in the quantities of the various amenities may not vary sufficiently over 
time to allow for identification.  Even if there were sufficient variation, it is not clear that one would want to include 
individual fixed effects, because these fixed effects may themselves capture part of the compensation for amenities in 
the labor market, especially if unobservably similar workers tend to choose locations with similar amenity bundles.  In 
this case, part of the compensating differential is imbedded in the fixed effects rather than in the estimated implicit 
amenity prices. 
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concern in any country, but for transition economies variance in data quality is high.  A crucial 
variable in our hedonic model is the market wage.  Actual earnings are problematic as a measure 
of equilibrium wages in Russia given that many Russian workers have wage arrears (60 percent of 
RLMS employees reported wage arrears in 1998) and that some actual earnings observations 
contain several months of back pay while others contain no pay for the current month.  Instead, we 
use the worker’s contractual wage, (natural log of) the average monthly wages at the worker’s 
primary job.  This wage information was specifically elicited from respondents in the 9th round of 
the survey.  As discussed by Earle and Sabirianova [14], the contractual wage circumvents the 
wage arrears problem and represents the best available wage measure for our study. 
 Data on housing prices also present a challenge.  The RLMS variable for the price of 
housing is owner-reported market house value.  We do not attempt to use rent data because the 
rental market was not developed by 2000 for most cities.  Our data show that only 6 percent of 
households rent their residence.  Only respondents who reside in their own housing report 
information on housing value and those values are what we analyze.  Figure 2 illustrates large 
variance of average city housing prices; they range from 37,250 to 947,291 rubles for 39 RLMS 
cities.   
Values reported by owners are reliable in the U.S., except for a tendency of owners who 
have recently purchased their houses to report values slightly higher than other evidence indicates 
their houses are worth; see Kiel and Zabel [30].  We assume, for lack of better information, the 
same to be the case in Russia.  We know that a substantial share of Russian households did not 
report housing values, perhaps because as of yet there is not a general knowledge of market prices 
due to relatively few transactions in any given area.  To correct for any bias in house prices caused 
by differences between the owners who report and owners who do not report, we estimate a 
selection equation for reporting as one of the alternatives to our benchmark specification.  
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The city-level data on amenities and economic conditions come from the Annual 
Registries of Russian cities.  The city registries contain information from the reports of 
municipalities submitted to the Russian Statistical Office (Goskomstat) for the period 1994-1999.  
The data allow us to exploit a variety of relevant city characteristics including total air pollution, 
amount of sulfur fall-out, effluent of dirty sewage, phone lines, number of physicians, crime rate, 
share of loss making firms, employment, migration, and development of public transportation.  
Most variables are taken for the year preceding the individual survey, 1999.  For some variables 
such as pollution, crime rate, and employment change (those with significant missing values, 
higher measurement error, and stronger time-series fluctuations) we use annual averages for the 
1994-1999 period.  
As shown in Table 1, some data are not available at the city-level and we use regional 
variables that come from the 2000 Goskomstat Regional Yearbook, the Practical Science 
Database, and regional risk indices.  These variables include climate variables, the morbidity rate, 
and an index of ethnic and political risk.  The latter variable from a study by Matiyasevich et al. 
[33] is included because of its high relevance for the quality of life in Russia.  The integrated 
index of ethnic and political risk is comprised of historic conflicts in international relations, 
religious confession homogeneity, tendency to sovereignty on the national level, emigration of 
non-native population, historical growth of Cossack settlements, and mass presence of refugees.  It 
ranges from 0 in Kostroma oblast (a region in Central Russia) to 9.388 in the Republic of 
Dagestan in Northern Caucasus.  The highest values are given to regions that are close to 
Chechnya areas of conflicts.  We can see if compensating differences are generated in the areas 
that are close to actual and potential wars, ethnic conflicts, and terrorism.  
Previous studies have shown the importance of commuting time in analyzing the quality of 
life.  The complication is that data on average commuting time is not available for cities outside 
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the RLMS data or for the year 2000.  Therefore we estimated commuting time equations using 
Rounds 5-8 (1994-1996, 1998) of the RLMS.  Commuting time in hours per week was expressed 
as a function of demographics (gender, age, and schooling), passengers per capita, and city-level 
variables measuring the local public transportation system such as types of public transportation, 
route length, and number of public vehicles.  These results are shown in Appendix 2.  For 
comparability purposes, we obtained predicted values for commuting time across 953 cities, all 
cities for which we have data, using the public transportation and passenger congestion variables.8 
Table 1 contains the full list of variables used in our analysis, and the descriptions and 
sources of the variables.  These variables were chosen because climate, public services, and 
environmental quality are theoretically relevant, previous studies of market economies have found 
them to be important, they are important determinants of the QOL in Russia, and they are the 
variables for which data are available. 
Gyourko and Tracy [24] enrich the model of wages, rents, and amenities by broadening the 
scope of amenities beyond natural amenities such as climate to include amenities that are locally 
produced.  They explicitly incorporate the local fiscal environment, i.e. publicly provided services 
and taxes, in their model and find substantial wage differentials as compensation for amenity 
differences in their analysis of U.S. cities.  As Gyourko, Kahn and Tracy [23] show, omitting 
property taxes will make full implicit prices biased towards more capitalization of locally 
produced goods into wages and less into housing prices.  We have some produced amenities as 
measured by crime rate, phone lines, commuting time, number of physicians, whether the city is a 
regional capital, and risk of ethnic unrest and some partly publicly produced amenities such as air 
pollution and water pollution.  However, the property taxes paid by Russian households amount to 
                                                          
8 By not including the demographic variables, we are evaluating the predicted commuting time at a constant set of 
demographics across cities.  The mean values of the demographic variables multiplied by their estimated coefficients 
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an insignificant portion of the local budget.  This will reduce the size of the bias that is due to the 
omitted property taxes in our model.  
Another possible modification to the model of wages, rents, and amenities is to include the 
consumption of private, locally produced goods excluding housing.  Gabriel, Mattey and Wascher 
[17] incorporate nonhousing, local goods and demonstrate that the compensating differential in the 
price of local consumption goods becomes a third component of the full price of amenities.  They 
find that the estimates of full implicit prices of some amenities are different when they are based 
on the three differentials rather than only wages and housing prices.  Overall, however, their 
rankings for the 50 (U.S.) states for the period between 1981 and 1990 based on QOLI with two 
differentials and their augmented QOLI with three differentials had a Spearman rank correlation 
equal to 0.9.  We rely on this overall similarity for Russia because we do not have data for prices 
of local consumption goods excluding housing.  As an alternative to our basic specification we do 
try adding a regional-level variable that measures the minimum income needed for subsistence.  
The level of subsistence is highly correlated with consumer prices and excludes housing prices. 
Recently, Gabriel and Rosenthal [18] develop the model of wages, rents, and amenities 
model further to estimate the “quality of the business environment,” i.e., the value of location 
specific amenities to firms.  For a pure consumption amenity, they start with the fact that housing 
(land) prices and wages are both costs to firms and show that to get a measure of the value of the 
amenity to firms, the compensating wage differential is added to (not subtracted from) the housing 
price differential.  They use the value to firms along with the value to consumers/workers to 
analyze migration and the growth and composition of 37 cities in the U.S. over the period 1977-
1995.  We focus on the location decisions and quality of life of consumers/workers rather than 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
in the commuting time equation is subsumed into the constant terms of the estimated wage and housing hedonic 
equations.  
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firms, and therefore use the more traditional formulation of Rosen [39] and Roback [38] using data 
from the RLMS, city registries, and other available Russian sources. 
5. Estimated Implicit Prices, Government Regional Policy, and Quality of Life 
a.  Labor and Housing Markets and Implicit Prices 
 To obtain the full-implicit prices of location-specific amenities given in (4), we begin by 
estimating a reduced form of wage and housing prices hedonic equations:  
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where Xij is a vector of individual characteristics of worker i residing in location j, Zhj is a vector of 
housing characteristics of residence h, Aj is a vector of location amenities, Dj are location controls 
for economy disequilibrium; β2 and γ2 will give us a reduced-form estimate of dwk/dak and dpk/dak, 
respectively in (4).  We assume εij and uhj to be independent at first and then we will relax this 
assumption and estimate (6) as the system of simultaneous equations, allowing for correlation 
between εij and uhj. 
First, we estimate a reduced-form wage equation as a function of individual characteristics 
(Xij), location amenities (Aj), and controls for labor market disequilibrium (Dj).  Because our 
model assumes that workers are homogenous, the implied equilibrium wage equation would 
include only location amenities.  However, empirically we must control for worker heterogeneity, 
so we include a series of individual characteristics.  Similarly, our model assumes that the labor 
market is in equilibrium.  In order to control empirically for potential disequilibrium situations, we 
also include measures of annual employment change and the local share of firms making losses. 
As in all of the statistical estimates reported in the paper, we use the STATA software 
package.  Robust standard errors from the Huber-White estimator are used to calculate standard 
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errors with clustering by the 39 cities in the RLMS.  The wage equation results are reported in 
Table 2, along with means, standard deviations, and minimums and maximums of the variables 
used in the estimation.  The estimates in Table 2 are performed without RLMS sample weights.  
The weights include many of the same variables we already include in our model, so any gain will 
be mostly from improved efficiency.  However, we already employ the Huber-White estimator to 
produce robust standard errors and account for a general form of heteroscedasticity.  Later in the 
paper, we compare the quality of life rankings that we obtain using the estimates reported with 
those obtained using sample weights. 
In general, the results for the individual characteristics are quite consistent with what one 
would find for a typical Mincer earnings equation.  There are positive returns to schooling, and 
quadratic experience-earnings and tenure-earnings profiles.  The estimated returns to schooling are 
below typical recent estimates for Russia and other transition economies (see Fleisher, Sabirianova 
Peter and Wang [16]) since we have a more extensive set of individual and location controls which 
are positively correlated with years of schooling.  Without occupation dummies and amenity 
variables, the estimated returns to schooling would fall in the same range as those typically 
obtained in the U.S.9 and would be higher than those reported by Brainerd [7] for 1993-94, using a 
different Russian data source, monthly cross-section household surveys conducted by the All-
Russian Center for Public Opinion Research.  Our estimated experience and tenure profiles are 
slightly more concave than the experience profiles reported by Brainerd [7], perhaps because we 
use actual rather than potential years of experience.  These profiles are flatter and less concave 
than those typically estimated in the U.S. 
The wage effects for the 11 amenity variables are jointly significant; the F(11,38) = 9.51.      
                                                          
9 See Barron, Berger, and Black [3] and Card [9] for some typical cross-section estimates using Census and Current 
Population data.   
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The theoretical model makes clear that it is the full compensation through both the housing and 
labor markets that ultimately matters for determining quality of life differences.  Nonetheless, it is 
interesting to note that the coefficients for most of the amenity variables are statistically significant 
and have the sign that would be expected if all compensation were through the labor market.   
The disequilibrium variables suggest that in areas in which firms are making losses, wages 
are lower, but that increased employment is positively related to wages.  The two disequilibrium 
variables are jointly significant in the determination of wages; F(2,38) = 12.3 and suggest it is 
important to include these controls in our hedonic model of Russian wage determination.10 
Next, we turn to the estimation of the housing hedonic model.  The set of housing 
characteristics is less than ideal in that there is not information on the age of the structure, for 
example.  As shown in Table 3, the results for the structural characteristics that we do have seem 
reasonable.   The amenity variables are jointly significant; F(11,38) = 19.63.  However, many of 
the individual coefficients have low t-values.  Some coefficients have unexpected signs if all 
compensation came through the housing market, but it is the total compensation through both 
markets that matters.11  The two disequilibrium variables are jointly significant; F(2,38) = 10.94.  
Larger employment decline and higher shares of firms losing money are associated with lower 
housing prices. 
 In Table 4, we combine the estimated wage and housing price differentials into annual full 
implicit prices per household using Eq. 4 evaluated at the means of wage, number of workers, and 
housing value of the sample, assuming a 4.35 percent interest rate for converting house value to 
annual rent.12  This calculation involves multiplying the negative of the parameter estimate in the 
                                                          
10 Such controls for disequilibrium forces have also been used in wage and housing hedonics using U.S. data; see, for 
example, Berger and Blomquist [5]. 
11  Because the full implicit price shown in equation 4 above calls for the total differential of the effect of an amenity, 
we estimate both wage and housing price equations in reduced form.   
12 This rate is found by dividing the predicted annual rent by the average house price for 2000, where rent is predicted 
from regression of monthly rental payments of tenants on characteristics of rented residence. 
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log wage equation by the mean wage to convert the estimated effect into rubles and then 
multiplying by 12 and 2.65 full-time equivalent workers per household to convert to annual 
household compensation in the labor market.  The labor market compensation is added to the 
housing market compensation which is simply the housing market estimated parameter multiplied 
by the mean housing value to convert to rubles, and by 0.0435 to get an imputed annual housing 
expenditure.  A negative full implicit price means that a characteristic is a disamenity while a 
positive price is an amenity. 
The full implicit prices based on the wage equation estimates shown in Table 2 and the 
housing value estimates shown in Table 3 are reported in the first column of Table 4 and under 
OLS Benchmark.  The implicit prices are all of the expected sign and all but air pollution and 
commuting time are statistically significant at the 10 percent level or higher.13  Phone lines, 
number of physicians, and location in a capital city are amenities and the remaining variables are 
disamenities.  The full implicit prices are expressed in thousands of rubles per year.   
In order to get a better idea of the amount of compensation involved given the different 
scaling of the units of the different amenities, the last column of Table 4 shows the compensation 
required for one standard deviation change in the amenity or disamenity from its mean value for 
the OLS benchmark results.  This column shows the amount in thousands of rubles that the 
average Russian household would be willing to pay for one standard deviation increase in the 
quantity of local amenities and would be willing to accept for one standard deviation increase in 
                                                          
13 The standard errors on the full implicit prices are obtained by taking a linear combination of the standard errors in 
the wage and housing price hedonic equations, with the same weights as those used to calculate the full implicit price 
and with the assumption that the covariance between the partial prices is zero.  This is the same approach used by 
Blomquist, Berger, and Hoehn [6].  The full implicit price on the capital city dummy is calculated using the 
transformation proposed by Halvorsen and Palmquist [25].  Full implicit prices based on seemingly unrelated 
regression, which take into account correlations in the errors, are reported in Table 4. 
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the quantity of local disamenities.14  One standard deviation changes in heating degree days, total 
precipitation, and crime rate produce the largest implicit annual compensation in the housing and 
labor markets.  The amounts are 7,496, 6,695, and 9,371 rubles per year per household, 
respectively.  These compensation amounts are sizable compared to the mean annual salary of 
23,940 rubles for a worker.  For a one standard deviation improvement in the crime rate, the 
compensation for the average household is 39 percent of the average worker’s salary; it is 15 
percent of the average household’s annual earnings.   
Full implicit prices using four alternative methods of estimation are also reported in Table 
4.  The Heckman column shows full implicit prices based on a housing value regression that 
accounts for the fact that a significant number of respondents did not report a housing value.  The 
regression estimates are provided in Appendix 3.  The  Heckman maximum likelihood selection 
model has two equations: an equation explaining whether a respondent reports a housing value 
and a second equation in which the log of housing value is a function of housing characteristics, 
location amenities, disequilibrium variables, and the inverse Mills ratio.  The model is identified 
by including demographic characteristics of the respondent in the selection equation such as 
gender, age dummies, level of education, and computer skills.  Demographic characteristics that 
are included in the selection equation may be correlated with knowledge of the housing market 
and thus the propensity to report a housing value.  We find that older respondents and less 
educated individuals, who may have less knowledge of the housing market, are less likely to 
report a housing value.  Those with computer skills are more likely to report a housing value.  In 
the housing hedonic, the estimated inverse Mills ratio (λ) has a negative coefficient, but it is not 
statistically significant.  This implies that there is a weak indication that holding housing 
                                                          
14 The hedonic estimates are only strictly valid for small changes in the quantities of amenities and disamenities.   
However, the vehicle of considering one standard deviation changes has been used often in the literature to illustrate 
the relative sizes of the implicit compensations for various amenities.  Also, see footnote 6 about sorting. 
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characteristics, location amenities, and disequilibrium conditions constant, a random person from 
the population would report a higher housing value than those who actually report, but the 
difference is not significant.  The end result is that the full implicit prices based on the Heckman 
specification are similar to the estimated prices for the OLS benchmark. 
Table 4 also reports the full implicit prices estimates using the feasible generalized least 
squares method (FGLS) to address the potential heteroskedasticity of the error term in both 
equations.  Although standard tests did not indicate the presence of heteroskedasticity in the wage 
equation, the modified White test (but not a Breusch-Pagan test) detected it in the housing 
equation; F(2, 1486) = 28.96).  We use FGLS to obtain more efficient estimates when the form of 
heteroskedasticity is unknown.  These results too are very similar to the OLS-estimated prices.   
In all three sets of estimates reported above, we assumed a zero covariance between partial 
prices in calculating the standard errors of full implicit prices.  To relax this assumption, we 
created a partially overlapping sub-sample that matches houses and heads of households (defined 
as the household member with largest labor earnings) and applied seemingly unrelated estimation 
(SUEST).  Based on separate estimates of two hedonic equations, SUEST generates a 
simultaneous covariance matrix for pairs of regressions allowing for computing robust/clustered 
standard errors for the linear combination of coefficients with non-zero covariance (the “lincom” 
command in Stata).  Despite a significant reduction in the sample size of wage earners, the SUEST 
results reported in Table 4 are similar to the OLS-estimated prices for the full sample except for 
air pollution which switches sign but has low t-values in both specifications. 
One valid concern with a separate estimate of two hedonic equations is the assumption of 
no cross-equation correlation of error terms.  The errors could be correlated due to simultaneity of 
decisions regarding housing and labor market participation and also due to omitted variables that 
are common in both hedonic equations (for example, unobserved location-specific amenities); thus 
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leading to the biased estimates of partial and full implicit prices.   To address this concern, we 
apply the Zellner’s method of seemingly unrelated regressions (SUREG), which allows for 
correlated errors between equations.  The method can be implemented on the fully overlapping 
sample of working heads of households, for which the average house value and earnings are non-
missing.  Our sample is reduced to 1087 observations.  Another disadvantage of this method is 
that clustered standard errors are not allowed within the SUREG procedure, but this does not 
affect the magnitude of coefficients.  Compared to the estimated prices for the OLS benchmark, 
the full implicit price for home phone lines and ethnic-political risk grow, and the price for doctors 
shrinks (Table 4).   
In sum, despite the different estimation methods and substantial differences in samples and 
sample sizes, the estimated implicit prices shown in Table 4 are quite consistent.15  Regardless of 
the method, we find that compensation exists for the 11 amenities across cities in Russia.  
b. Government Regional Wage Coefficients and Implicit Market Prices 
 Our initial formulation of the wage and housing price hedonic model omitted the 
government regional wage coefficient.  However, the government regional wage coefficients were 
designed to compensate for regional climate differences.  It is interesting to determine how much 
compensation for location amenities exists in Russian wage and housing markets after controlling 
for the regional wage coefficients or whether the market compensation replicates the kind of 
compensation that was in place even during the Soviet period.16 
 Table 5 shows the wage differentials after including the government regional wage 
coefficient variable.  As expected, this variable is highly significant:  areas with higher values for 
                                                          
15 The correlation in QOLI ranking of cities with the OLS Benchmark ranking is at least 0.9 for these alternative 
methods, as reported in Table 6 below.  The complete estimates of wage and housing value hedonic equations for each 
estimation procedure are available upon request. 
16 The government regional wage coefficients used in this paper are apparently very similar in magnitude to those 
used during the Soviet period. 
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the regional wage coefficient (worse climates) have higher wages.  Now, when heating degree 
days and total precipitation are taken together, their contributions are statistically insignificant at 
normal levels, F(2,38) = 1.53.  However, the amenities are still jointly statistically significant, 
F(11,38) = 8.66.  The government wage coefficient reduces the remaining compensation through 
the labor market, but it does not eliminate it.  The pattern is not as clear as for the housing value 
equation, nor should we expect it to be.  The government regional wage coefficients were 
designed to reflect compensation in the labor market, not the housing market.  Some of the 
estimated amenity coefficients become insignificant after the introduction of the government wage 
coefficient, others become significant.  However, the amenities are still jointly significant, 
F(11,38) = 11.37.   While some of the compensation generated by the market duplicates 
compensation reflected in the government regional wage coefficients, there is additional market 
compensation taking place.   
c. Quality of Life across Russian Cities 
 
We are now in a position to calculate quality of life index values.  We use the full implicit 
prices for the 11 amenities that were estimated with the RLMS data on wages and house values 
with matched administrative data from 39 cities.  The full implicit prices for the OLS benchmark 
specification shown in Table 4 are used to weight the bundle of amenities in each city to produce a 
quality of life index value.  Given that the RLMS cities are fairly representative of cities 
throughout Russia, we generate QOLI’s for 953 cities in the Russian Federation using the 
parameter estimates obtained from the RLMS data.17   Selected results are described here, but a 
complete ranking of all cities is available upon request. 
                                                          
17 RLMS employs a multi-stage probability sample.  At the national level, selected municipalities represent reasonably 
well the Russian urban population.  Appendix 1 provides a comparison of the amenity levels in the 39 RLMS cities 
with the full sample of 953 cities.  There are insignificant differences in the mean values of climate variables, air 
pollution, sulfur fall-out, morbidity rate, ethnic-political risk, and government regional wage coefficients.  At the same 
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The index values are most easily interpreted when comparing cities with one another.  The 
index values are denominated in thousands of year 2000 rubles per year.  The estimated minimum 
QOLI value is added to each index value so that all index values are positive and the lowest QOLI 
value is zero.  The range in the quality of life index across the 953 cities is 229,000 rubles, several 
times the average annual wage.  This variation is a much larger than the variation found by 
Blomquist, Berger, and Hoehn [6] across their sample of 253 U.S. counties, perhaps reflecting the 
greater variability in the basket of amenities in Russia relative to the U.S.  A one standard 
deviation improvement in the QOLI in Russia is approximately 30 percent of a typical 
household’s annual earnings (19,296 / 63,454 = 0.30).  This amount is an order of magnitude 
greater than the 3 percent that was found for the U.S. (667 / 20,053 = 0.03).  The amenities bundle 
in the two studies is different, but given the higher incomes in the U.S., this difference in the 
premium for a one standard deviation improvement is an indication that the greater variation in the 
QOLI is due to the greater variation in the amenity factors rather than variation in the prices.   
Figure 3 provides a graphical depiction of the quality of life index values by region.  The 
regional values are population-weighted values of the QOLI values for the cities in the region.  As 
such, they represent a regional urban average of quality of life.  In general, regions with cities with 
higher quality of life appear to be in the southern and European region of Russia.  There is 
variation within regions.  For example, within the Sverdlosk region in the Urals, the QOLI varies 
from a low of 146 thousand rubles per year in Sysert, ranked 925, to a high of 193 thousand rubles 
per year in the capital of Yekaterinburg, ranked 191.  Among the top twenty places ranked by 
QOLI are five large cities (Voronezh, Stavropol, Astrakhan, Volgograd, and Saratov) and several 
renowned spa resorts such as Essentuki, Kislovodsk, and Zheleznovodsk.  All are located in the 
southern part of Russia.  At the bottom of the ranking are cities such as Norilsk (953) that are 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
time, t-test reveals statistical differences at the 5 percent level in the mean values of water pollution, phone lines, 
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north of the Arctic Circle.  Norilsk is a Siberian city that once had a forced labor camp and is 
known for cold, severe pollution due to smelting, and acid rain.     
The two largest cities in our ranking are Moscow (224) and St. Petersburg (400).  These 
rankings appear low given that there is excess demand for available residence permits or propiskas 
in these two cities, suggesting that they are desirable places to live.  This localized disequilibrium 
for Moscow and St. Petersburg makes it difficult for us to get true quality of life rankings for these 
two cities.  First, the rationing of residence permits means that housing prices will not get bid up 
high enough and labor supply will not increase and wages will not be bid down enough to reflect 
quality of life in these two cities.  However, this problem should not be a very large one for our 
wage and housing parameter estimates since Moscow and St. Petersburg together only make up a 
small portion of the full RLMS sample.  However, the ranking for Moscow and St. Petersburg are 
still problematic under the system of rationed residence permits if their attractiveness is unique 
and cannot be accounted for by typical variables in quality of life indexes.  In this case, an 
appropriate strategy would be to include dummy variables for Moscow and St. Petersburg, but the 
system of residence permits would prevent us from estimating the full values of the unique 
amenities in those two cities.  We have estimated the wage and housing equations with dummy 
variables for Moscow and St. Petersburg and find, as reported in Table 6, that the QOL ranking 
with our base ranking is quite high, 0.98. 
We have also calculated alternative QOLIs to check the sensitivity and robustness of our 
original ranking.  Table 6 reports correlations of these alternative indexes and the resulting 
rankings with our original index and ranking.  Rows 1 and 2 show correlations with QOLIs after 
controlling for the government regional wage coefficient, 0.82 for the RLMS cities and 0.86 for 
the full sample of 953 cities.  Interestingly, as shown near the bottom of the table, the government 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
doctors, commuting time, crime rate, and capital city. 
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regional wage coefficients and our QOLI have a simple correlation of -0.66 for the RLMS cities 
and -0.39 for the full sample.  They would be perfectly negatively correlated if the government 
compensation and market compensation were equal for the same amenities. 
Rankings with dummy variables for Moscow and St. Petersburg, a set of alternative 
amenity variables described in Table 5, inclusion of the cost of subsistence level in each city, 
observations weighted by RLMS weights, and wages actually received last month, all are highly 
correlated with the ranking using our base hedonic equations (0.90-1.00).  The QOLIs and 
rankings obtained by different estimation methods (such as Heckman maximum likelihood, FGLS, 
and SUREG) are also very highly correlated with the OLS-based QOLI (0.91-1.00).   
Gyourko, Kahn, and Tracy [23] argue that if the observed amenities model is used, as in 
this paper, then it should be compared to the group effects model under the assumption that errors 
due to unaccounted unobservables in wage and housing price equations are caused primarily by 
omitted amenities rather than omitted worker or house characteristics.  Gyourko and Tracy [24] 
find that group effects can matter for specific amenity values and can matter in rankings too 
because the standard errors on the QOLI values can be large.  Gabriel, Mattey, and Wascher [17] 
use an observed amenities model and compare it to a group fixed effects model for the 50 states 
and find there is not much difference in the rankings (the Spearman rank correlation is 0.8). 
 Given these previous studies, it is worth comparing the rankings that would be obtained 
from a group effects model from those that we obtain from our observed amenity model. It is only 
possible to estimate city fixed effects for the 39 cities in the RLMS sample and not for the other 
cities in the full city sample.  We restrict our comparisons to these 39 cities.  Another complication 
is that our two disequilibrium variables vary only city to city and thus drop out of the city fixed 
effect model.  We recalculate the quality of life index to include the two disequilibrium variables 
and correlate the revised index with the city fixed effects.  The resulting correlation coefficients 
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are 0.47 for the simple correlation and 0.61 for the Spearman rank correlation.   While these 
correlations are lower than the one obtained by Gabriel, Mattey, and Wascher (2003), it does show 
that the alternative sets of rankings are fairly highly related to one another.  We would not expect 
the correlation to be one because variables such as building age, housing condition, and outside 
space are not included in the housing price equation due to unavailability.  This matters because 
differences in these housing structure characteristics erroneously will be attributed to differences 
in quality of life using the group effects approach.  In addition, our comparison points to the fact 
that a pure comparison is not possible using our models because of the presence of variables to 
control for disequilibrium forces in the housing and labor markets. 
6. Migration and Quality of Life 
 Despite the nature of transition from central planning to a market economy in Russia, we 
have substantial evidence that equilibrium forces exist.  The estimated wage and housing price 
equations show that wages depend on worker and job characteristics and housing price depend on 
house characteristics in expected ways.  Location specific amenities generate compensating 
differentials in both wages and housing prices.  This result is consistent with the prediction of the 
equilibrium framework.  These results come from equations that partly control for disequilibrium 
by including two variables in our equations, city annual employment change and share of firms in 
the city that are making losses. 
 Migration is important in the equilibrium framework in that migration of some 
consumer/workers and firms is necessary to achieve spatial equilibrium.  Migration is a real 
phenomenon in the transition economy of Russia.  Andrienko and Guriev [1] analyze gross region-
to-region migration flows in Russia. They report that total officially registered internal migration 
is approximately 2 percent per year during the 1990s.  This migration rate is considerably lower 
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than the migration rates of developed, market economies.18  Their analysis of migration flows 
during the period 1990-1999 shows that job opportunities matter, and that climate and local public 
goods matter as well.  This finding gives more credibility to our estimates of amenity 
compensating differentials in Russian in that migration is occurring and is influenced by location 
specific amenities. 
Our calculations from the Annual Registries of Russian Cities show higher level of internal 
migration in Russia.  During the 1994-1999 period, at least 3 percent annual changes in population 
due to migration are estimated for 73.3 percent of the cities, at least 5 percent annual changes for 
56.6 percent of the cities, and at least 10 percent annual changes for 27.7 percent of the cities.  
Even these rates, however, are lower than the migration rates of developed, market economies. 
 The existence of migration does not necessarily imply disequilibrium.  Life cycle 
motivation for migration can be thought of as an equilibrium phenomenon.  As households 
experience anticipated changes in income, they will anticipate relocating to areas that offer a 
bundle of amenities that more closely matches their new demands.  As households anticipate 
changing their participation in the labor market, say through retirement, they will relocate to areas 
that more closely match their demands; see Linneman and Graves [32] and Gyourko, Kahn, and 
Tracy [23].  Thus, migration can be related to equilibrium differences in quality of life as shown 
by Berger and Blomquist [5] using U.S. data.  Similarly, Brown [8] provides some evidence that 
aggregate region-to-region migration in Russia is related to air pollution and temperatures, which 
are components of typical quality of life indexes.  In the last two rows of Table 6, we show that 
our quality of life index is positively correlated with net migration into Russian cities. In other 
                                                          
18 The official data used by Andrienko and Guriev [1] may well understate the actual amount of migration in Russia.  
Almost half of the respondents in the RLMS report that they have lived for 6 consecutive months or more in a 
different location since age 14. 
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words, cities with higher measured quality of life attract more in migration, consistent with 
equilibrium movement toward high quality of life areas.19 
7. Conclusions 
This paper uses data from the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) and 
administrative sources to examine compensating differentials for location-specific amenities in the 
labor and housing markets.  We find that there is compensation generated in labor and housing 
markets for differences in amenities across cities in Russia.  This result may be surprising given 
the relatively recent transition to a market economy.  However, our results suggest that even 
nascent market economies are capable of generating compensating differentials.  Our results are 
consistent with available evidence on region-to-region migration in Russia.  While migration rates 
in Russia are below those in developed, market economies, they do appear to be sensitive to 
amenity variation across regions.  Apparently the migration that does occur is enough to generate 
inter-city variation in wages and housing prices due to inter-city variation in amenities.  The 
estimated wage and housing premiums are used to calculate a quality of life index across cities in 
the Russian Federation for the year 2000, the year for which we have complete data.  In general, 
quality of life is higher in cities in southern and European areas of Russia. 
Perhaps one of the reasons that market generated compensating differences have appeared 
relatively quickly in Russia is that there was a long history in the Soviet era of government 
mandated compensating differentials intended to offset climate differences.  These government 
regional wage differences still exist in the public sector.  We find that after controlling for these 
mandated differences in the public sector, we still are able to estimate compensating differentials 
                                                          
19 Mueser and Graves (1995) introduce moving costs to a model of compensating differentials to develop a model of 
migration.  They emphasize that migration results from changes that disturb the equilibrium wages, rent, and 
amenities.  Applied to Russia, their model implies that migration occurs because of changes in policy that reduce 
moving costs, and changes in amenities, and income. 
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and generate quality of life measures.  Thus, while government planners have been able to dictate 
some compensation for quality of life differences, there are still substantial compensating 
differentials on top of the government regional wage differentials.  This important result of market 
forces is readily observable in a country such as Russia in which the transition to a market is far 
from complete.  As transition continues, quality of life in Russia can be expected to change.  Kahn 
(2003) found that urban environmental quality has improved in Eastern Europe during transition 
and amenity bundles in Russian cities can be expected to change as environmental quality, crime 
and other factors change.  Valuations can change.  Costa and Kahn (2003) find evidence that the 
prices of climate and job fatality risk have risen over time in the U.S. and values can be expected 
to change in Russia during transition.  Policy decision makers will want to acknowledge the 
dynamic nature of quality of life and anticipate change.  Future changes aside, the many 
difficulties that Russia has experienced have not been enough to prevent market compensation for 
a broad array of amenities from taking hold in labor and housing markets at a fairly early phase of 
transition. 
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Table 1:  Variables and Data Sources 
 
Variable Name Variable Description Source 
Housing model variables 
Main regression 
Log of housing prices Log of housing market value, rubles RLMS2000 
Living space Living space (rooms) in square meters RLMS2000 
Share of non-living space Share of non-living space (kitchen, bathroom, hall, etc.) in the total housing space RLMS2000 
Privatized housing 1 if housing is privatized; 0 otherwise RLMS2000 
Central heating 1 if central heating system; 0 otherwise RLMS2000 
Central water supply 1 if central water supply; 0 otherwise RLMS2000 
Hot water supply 1 if hot water supply; 0 otherwise RLMS2000 
Piped gas 1 if piped gas; 0 otherwise RLMS2000 
Central sewerage 1 if central sewerage system; 0 otherwise RLMS2000 
Home phone 1 if family has phone; 0 otherwise RLMS2000 
 
Additional variables in the selection probit equation 
Reported housing value 1 if respondent reported the approximate market value of housing; 0 otherwise RLMS2000 
Female 1 if female; 0 if male  RLMS2000 
Age categories Five age categories: 15-24; 25-34; 35-44; 45-54; 55+ (omitted) RLMS2000 
Education categories Five education categories: elementary (omitted); secondary, vocational; technical; 
university 
RLMS2000 
Computer skills 1 if respondent has ever used a computer; 0 otherwise RLMS2000 
Wage model variables 
Log of monthly wages Log of average monthly wages at the primary job, rubles RLMS2000 
Log of monthly hours Log of usual hours of work per month at the primary job RLMS2000 
Female 1 if female; 0 if male  RLMS2000 
Married 1 if now married; 0 otherwise RLMS2000 
Years of schooling Highest year of school attended RLMS2000 
Actual experience Years of actual labor market experience RLMS2000 
Experience squared Years of actual labor market experience squared RLMS2000 
Tenure Years of work at the same enterprise RLMS2000 
Tenure squared Years of work at the same enterprise squared RLMS2000 
Self-employed =1 if self-employed; 0 if employees RLMS2000 
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Industry dummy variables 15 industry dummies include energy and fuel industry; metallurgy and chemicals; 
machine-building; wood processing; light and food industries; agriculture (omitted); 
transportation and communications; construction; trade; finance and commerce; 
municipal utilities; health; education, culture, and art; public administration; and other 
industries 
RLMS2000 
Occupation dummy variables 8 occupation dummies include officials and managers; professionals; associate 
professionals and technicians; clerks; service workers; craft workers; operators and 
assemblers; military specialist; elementary occupations (omitted) 
RLMS2000 
City-level variables
City (municipal) amenities 
Air pollution Air pollution, tons per Ha, 1994-1999 average GKSCITY 
Sulfur fall-out Fall-out of sulfurous anhydride, tons per Ha, 1994-1999 average GKSCITY 
Water pollution Effluent of dirty sewage, thousands cubic m per Ha, 1994-1999 average GKSCITY 
Total phone lines Number of phone lines per capita, 1999 GKSCITY 
Home phone lines Number of home phone lines per capita, 1999 GKSCITY 
Doctors Number of physicians per 100 population, 1999 GKSCITY 
Commuting time Predicted commuting time (calculated by the authors from the estimated commuting time 
equation) 
Authors 
Crime rate Number of registered crimes per 1,000 population, 1994-1999 average GKSCITY 
Capital city 1 if central city of a region; 0 otherwise Authors 
City disequilibrium variables 
Share of loss-making firms Share of loss-making firms, 1999 GKSCITY 
Employment change Annual employment change, percent, 1994-1999 average GKSCITY 
Average mobility change Annual change in population due to migration per 1,000 population, 1994-1999 average GKSCITY 
Regional-level variables 
Regional amenities 
Temperature in warm period Sum of temperature in warm period, >10 C PSD 
Heating degree days (cold) Sum of heating degree days, <0 C  PSD 
Total precipitation Sum of precipitation in warm and cold periods, mm  PSD 
Precipitation in cold period Sum of precipitation in cold period, mm  PSD 
Morbidity rate Morbidity rate or number of illnesses per capita, 1999 GKS2000 
Ethnic and political risk Index for ethnic and political risk, 1998:  integrated index comprised of historic conflicts 
in inter-national relations, confession homogeneity, tendency to sovereignty on the 
national level, emigration of non-native population, historical growth of Cossack 
settlements, and mass presence of refugees 
RISK1998 
Level of subsistence Minimum amount needed for subsistence, thousand rubles per month, 1999 GKS2000 
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Regional wage coefficients Regional compensating wage coefficients for public employees  
Table 1: Variables and Data Sources (continued) 
 
Variable Name Variable Description Source 
Commuting time equation variables 
Commuting time Weekly hours of commuting from/to work, 1994-1996, 1998 RLMS9498 
Female 1 if female; 0 if male  RLMS9498 
Years of schooling Highest year of school attended RLMS9498 
Age Years RLMS9498 
Available public transportation 1 if city has only buses; 2 if city has also trams and/or trolley buses; 3 if city has subway; 
1994-1996, 1998 
GKSCITY 
Route length Average length of a route, km, 1994-1996, 1998 GKSCITY 
Number of public vehicles Number of buses, trams and trolley buses per 1,000 population, 1994-1996, 1998 GKSCITY 
Number of passengers Annual sum of passengers per capita, 1994-1996, 1998 GKSCITY 
 
Sources: 
RLMS2000 – 9th round of the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey, conducted in October-December 2000 
RLMS9498 – 5-8th rounds of the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey, conducted in 1994-1996 and 1998 
GKS2000 – Goskomstat, Regions of Russia 2000, Moscow: Goskomstat, 2000 
GKSCITY – Goskomstat Database, Annual Registries of Russian Cities, 1994-1999 
PSD – Practical Science Database  
RISK – Matiyasevich T., et al. “Russia: Regional Risk Rating,” Vienna: Bank Austria AG, 1998 
Regional wage coefficients are provided by the deputy parliament group on social policy 
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Table 2:  Wage Equation with Amenities, RLMS Cities, 2000 
 
OLS with Clustering Coeff. t Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent Variable 
Log of monthly wages   7.235 0.842 3.00 11.51 
For reference: monthly wages, rubles  1,995 2,671 20 100,000 
Human Capital Characteristics 
Log of monthly hours 0.428 10.79 5.100 0.378 1.39 6.33 
Female -0.355 -13.24 0.529 0.499 0 1 
Married 0.045 1.57 0.658 0.474 0 1 
Years of schooling 0.051 7.09 12.262 2.243 3 18 
Actual experience 0.024 5.95 20.997 12.299 0 62 
Experience squared / 100 -0.055 -7.25 5.921 6.017 0 38.44 
Tenure 0.011 2.63 7.259 8.855 0 58.75 
Tenure squared / 100 -0.016 -1.46 1.311 2.918 0 34.52 
Occupations 
Officials and managers 0.443 5.84 0.046 0.210 0 1 
Professionals 0.449 8.31 0.167 0.373 0 1 
Associate professionals 0.281 5.90 0.179 0.384 0 1 
Clerks 0.144 3.04 0.066 0.248 0 1 
Service workers -0.028 -0.53 0.107 0.309 0 1 
Craft workers 0.250 5.54 0.181 0.385 0 1 
Operators/assemblers 0.277 6.59 0.149 0.357 0 1 
Military specialists 0.105 1.25 0.013 0.113 0 1 
Self-employed 0.141 0.06 0.086 0.281 0 1 
Amenities/Disamenities 
Heating degree days / 100 (cold) 0.416 2.05 1.431 0.228 0.81 1.85 
Total precipitation / 100 0.068 1.72 5.335 1.384 3.29 8.21 
Air pollution 0.006 0.71 2.837 3.066 0.15 13.04 
Water pollution 0.016 2.83 5.924 7.014 0.00 27.36 
Home phone lines -0.865 -2.62 0.194 0.089 0.07 0.71 
Doctors -0.417 -2.58 0.621 0.248 0.21 1.12 
Commuting time 0.274 2.16 4.519 0.430 3.70 5.38 
Crime rate 0.010 2.32 21.032 7.803 8.21 42.87 
Morbidity rate 0.806 2.42 0.736 0.102 0.52 0.94 
Capital city -0.213 -1.63 0.599 0.490 0 1 
Ethnic-political risk 0.046 2.89 1.700 1.692 0.17 8.92 
Disequilibrium Variables 
Share of loss-making firms -1.817 -4.17 0.336 0.089 0.12 0.57 
Employment change 2.029 1.51 -0.032 0.030 -0.12 0.02 
Constant 1.664 2.21     
N = 3017 workers  R2 = 0.464 
F-test for eleven amenities/disamenities: F(11, 38) = 9.51 
F-test for two disequilibrium variables: F(2, 38) = 12.3 
 
Notes:  Dependent variable is log of average monthly wages in rubles.  Elementary occupations are omitted from the 
list of occupation dummies.  15 industry dummies are included but not shown.  The t-statistics are defined with 
robust clustered standard errors allowing for correlation within the 39 RLMS cities.   
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Table 3:  Housing Value Equation with Amenities, RLMS Cities, 2000  
 
Main Regression Coeff. z Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent Variable 
Log of housing market value   12.070 0.770 8.70 14.73 
For reference: house values, rubles  234,892 223,587 6,000 2,500,000
Housing Characteristics 
Living space 0.028 14.22 32.822 12.842 6 150 
Share of non-living space 1.225 5.17 0.356 0.112 0 0.83 
Privatized housing 0.037 1.28 0.639 0.480 0 1 
Central heating 0.047 0.56 0.877 0.328 0 1 
Central water supply 0.122 2.02 0.918 0.274 0 1 
Hot water supply 0.208 3.62 0.712 0.453 0 1 
Piped gas 0.157 2.25 0.876 0.329 0 1 
Central sewerage 0.155 1.61 0.858 0.350 0 1 
Home phone 0.177 5.03 0.590 0.492 0 1 
Amenities/Disamenities 
Heating degree days / 100 (cold) -0.167 -0.72 1.435 0.247 0.81 1.85 
Total precipitation / 100 0.005 0.11 5.121 1.328 3.29 8.21 
Air pollution -0.009 -0.94 2.899 3.233 0.15 13.04 
Water pollution 0.029 3.97 5.064 6.349 0.00 27.36 
Home phone lines -0.540 -1.06 0.184 0.081 0.07 0.71 
Doctors -0.568 -3.32 0.600 0.247 0.21 1.12 
Commuting time 0.474 2.90 4.481 0.414 3.70 5.38 
Crime rate 0.006 0.81 21.265 7.678 8.21 42.87 
Morbidity rate 0.240 0.58 0.732 0.104 0.52 0.94 
Capital city 0.067 0.39 0.570 0.495 0 1 
Ethnic-political risk 0.045 2.38 1.710 1.599 0.17 8.92 
Disequilibrium Variables
Share of loss-making firms -2.525 -3.40 0.345 0.092 0.12 0.57 
Employment change 3.063 2.26 -0.031 0.031 -0.12 0.02 
Constant 8.991 10.41     
N = 1489 houses                R2 = 0.603 
F-test for eleven amenities/disamenities: F(11, 38) = 19.63 
F-test for two disequilibrium variables: F(2, 38) = 10.94 
 
Notes:  Dependent variable is log of housing market value in rubles.  The sample is restricted to households which 
occupy their own houses and which live in cities.  The t-statistics are defined with robust clustered standard errors 
allowing for correlation within 39 RLMS cities.  
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Table 4:  Implicit Prices for City Amenities, Alternative Estimation Methods, 2000 
 
 OLS  
Benchmark Heckman FGLS SUEST SUREG 
QOLI 
Changes 
Heating degree days (cold)  -0.282 -0.282 -0.266 -0.308 -0.323 -7.496 
    (-2.14) (-2.14) (-2.41) (-3.15) (-4.05)  
Total precipitation -0.042 -0.042 -0.041 -0.039 -0.045 -6.695 
 (-1.67) (-1.65) (-1.93) (-1.82) (-3.33)  
Air pollution -0.446 -0.460 -0.334 0.014 0.068 -5.355 
 (-0.87) (-0.90) (-0.76) (0.03) (0.17)  
Water pollution -0.715 -0.706 -0.739 -0.803 -0.628 -5.072 
 (-1.96) (-1.93) (-2.44) (-2.59) (-2.22)  
Home phone lines 49.473 50.566 51.522 42.749 65.180 4.260 
 (2.29) (2.34) (2.90) (2.36) (3.50)  
Doctors 20.672 20.779 16.302 15.695 11.931 3.398 
 (1.99) (2.00) (1.64) (1.58) (1.33)  
Commuting time -12.548 -12.304 -13.795 -13.429 -14.079 -4.213 
 (-1.52) (-1.49) (-2.07) (-2.31) (-3.48)  
Crime rate -0.595 -0.600 -0.645 -0.449 -0.505 -9.371 
 (-2.05) (-2.07) (-2.69) (-1.75) (-2.60)  
Morbidity rate -48.779 -48.248 -49.155 -51.810 -41.436 -5.614 
 (-2.26) (-2.23) (-2.75) (-2.91) (-3.10)  
Capital city 14.206 13.982 17.001 18.969 18.986 3.600 
 (1.68) (1.65) (2.42) (2.77) (3.61)  
Ethnic-political risk -2.460 -2.439 -2.145 -2.294 -3.257 -4.984 
 (-2.40) (-2.38) (-2.78) (-2.56) (-3.80)  
N – wage equation 3017 3017 3017 1796 1087  
N – housing equation 1489 1487/2331 1489 1489 1087  
R2 – wage equation 0.464 0.464 0.499 0.473 0.495  
R2 – housing equation 0.603 … 0.604 0.603 0.584  
Samples 
Separate 
workers  
& houses 
Separate 
workers  
& houses 
Separate 
workers 
& houses 
Matched 
HH heads 
& houses 
Matched 
HH heads 
& houses 
 
 
Notes:  QOLI changes show changes in the mean value of quality of life index in response to one standard deviation 
increase in the amount of corresponding amenity using OLS estimates.  Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering in 39 
RLMS cities are in parentheses, except for SUREG.  Full implicit prices are estimated at the mean of housing values and 
wages.  The number of workers per household is measured in full-time equivalent units as a ratio of total working hours of 
all household members to the average hours in the sample.  Average number of full-time workers per household is 2.65. 
Interest rate is 4.35%.  Mean wages is 1995 rubles per month.  Mean housing value is 234,892 rubles.  FGLS=feasible 
generalized least squares; SUEST=seemingly unrelated estimation; SUREG=seemingly unrelated regression; 
HH=household.  Breusch-Pagan test of independence in SUREG: chi2(1)=16.149 (P=0.0001). 
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Table 5:  Implicit Prices for City Amenities, Alternative Specifications, 2000 
 
Amenities and Disequilibrium 
Variables 
Wage Differential 
(OLS) 
Housing Value 
Differential (OLS) Full Implicit Price 
Coeff. t Coeff. t Coeff. T 
A. Specification with government regional wage coefficients 
Heating degree days / 100  (cold) 0.020 0.11 -0.506 -1.76 -6.429 -0.53 
Total precipitation / 100 0.053 1.69 -0.008 -0.18 -3.430 -1.69 
Air pollution 0.001 0.21 -0.010 -1.04 -0.184 -0.45 
Water pollution 0.008 1.91 0.022 2.80 -0.286 -1.02 
Home phone lines -0.208 -0.56 0.038 0.07 13.584 0.56 
Doctors -0.316 -2.07 -0.492 -2.83 15.049 1.53 
Commuting time 0.273 1.90 0.471 2.69 -12.523 -1.35 
Crime rate 0.002 0.35 0.000 0.04 -0.109 -0.34 
Morbidity rate 0.464 1.51 0.026 0.06 -29.237 -1.46 
Capital city -0.203 -1.32 0.093 0.52 13.866 1.39 
Ethnic-political risk 0.024 2.38 0.025 1.30 -1.278 -1.90 
Share of loss-making firms -1.709 -5.18 -2.405 -3.98 … … 
Employment change 1.459 1.39 2.444 2.00 … … 
Gov’t. regional wage coefficients 0.585 3.95 0.463 2.15 … … 
Test for 11 amenities/disamenities F(11, 38) = 8.66 F(11, 38) = 11.37   
Test for 2 disequilibrium variables F(2, 38) = 15.17 F(2, 38) = 14.27   
Test for 2 climate variables F(2, 38) = 1.53 F(2, 38) = 1.67   
 
N = 3017  
R2 = 0.477 
N = 1489 
R2 =0.612 
  
B. Specification with alternative amenity variables 
Temperature in warm period / 100 -0.018 -1.59 0.013 1.39 1.302 1.75 
Precipitation in cold period / 100 0.206 2.07 0.100 0.96 -12.089 -1.88 
Sulfur fall-out 0.053 0.87 0.009 0.17 -3.282 -0.84 
Water pollution 0.019 4.39 0.031 6.56 -0.863 -3.15 
Total phone lines -0.929 -3.43 -0.453 -1.01 54.396 3.06 
Doctors -0.256 -1.99 -0.540 -3.32 10.736 1.29 
Commuting time 0.285 2.09 0.456 2.60 -13.468 -1.52 
Crime rate 0.012 2.16 0.009 1.29 -0.690 -1.86 
Morbidity rate 0.810 2.23 0.405 0.89 -47.353 -2.01 
Capital city -0.242 -1.65 0.068 0.40 16.076 1.70 
Ethnic-political risk 0.028 2.43 0.051 3.43 -1.274 -1.69 
Share of loss-making firms -1.808 -3.59 -2.438 -3.69 … … 
Employment change 3.020 1.78 3.767 2.63 … … 
 N = 3017 
R2 = 0.463 
N=1489 
R2 = 0.604   
 
Notes: t-statistics are defined with robust clustered standard errors allowing for correlation within 39 cities.  Summary 
statistics for alternative amenity variables is provided in Appendix 1.  Both specifications also include the same set of 
human capital and housing characteristics as Tables 2 and 3.  Full implicit prices are estimated at the mean of housing 
values and wages.  Sample is restricted to respondents residing in cities.
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Table 6:  Ranking Sensitivity Analysis 
 
 
Correlation 
between QOLI 
Values 
Spearman’s 
Correlation 
between 
Rankings 
Alternative QOLI Rankings:   
1.  With government regional wage coefficients (all 953 
cities) 
0.8604 0.8239 
2. With government regional wage coefficients (39 RLMS 
cities) 
0.8230 0.7925 
3. With Moscow and St. Petersburg included as a dummy 
variable (all 953 cities) 
0.9801 0.9854 
4. With alternative amenity variables described in Table 5 (all 
953 cities) 
0.9011 0.9000 
5. With the level of subsistence (all 953 cities) 
(Mean=0.148; Std.Dev.=0.043) 
0.9803 0.9792 
6. With survey weights (all 953 cities) 
 
0.9964 0.9941 
7. With wages actually received last month in the OLS wage 
equation (all 953 cities) 
0.9643 0.9605 
8. Based on the Heckman ML housing equation (with sample 
selection, all 953 cities) 
0.9999 0.9999 
9. Using feasible generalized least squares (all 953 cities)         
 
0.9951 0.9966 
10. Based on seemingly unrelated regressions (all 953 cities) 0.9148 
 
0.9634 
11. With city fixed effects (39 RLMS cities, amenities plus 
disequilibrium variables) 
 
0.4674 0.6055 
Government Regional Wage Coefficients 
  
1. All 953 cities 
        
-0.3869 -0.4893 
2. 39 RLMS cities 
       
-0.6602 -0.5967 
Mobility Change 
  
1. Average mobility change in 1994-1999 (all 953 cities)   
      (Mean=3.112; Std.Dev.=8.767) 
0.2699 0.2134 
2. Average mobility change in 1998-1999 (all 953 cities)   
      (Mean=0.678; Std.Dev.=9.234) 
0.2452 0.1788 
 
Notes:  The table shows the coefficients of correlation between the base QOLI values and alternative QOLI values.  
The table also contains the coefficients of correlation between the base QOLI values and government regional wage 
“coefficients” and between the base QOLI values and the change in city mobility.  Average mobility change is 
defined as an average annual change in population due to migration per 1,000 city residents.  Mean value and 
standard deviation for average mobility change and the level of subsistence are shown in parentheses. 
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Appendix 1:  Sample Mean Comparison Tests  
 
Variables 
Sample of  
953 Cities 
Sample of  
39 RLMS Cities 
Two-
Sample 
t Test 
P-value 
Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. 
Heating degree days /100  (cold) 1.428 0.266 1.415 0.212 0.363 0.719 
Temperature in warm period /100 20.387 6.024 20.626 4.792 -0.302 0.764 
Total precipitation /100 5.428 1.524 5.596 1.449 -0.711 0.481 
Precipitation in cold period /100 1.422 0.559 1.425 0.435 -0.044 0.965 
Air pollution 2.696 12.733 2.170 2.650 0.889 0.376 
Sulfur fall-out 1.056 10.761 0.483 0.785 1.545 0.123 
Water pollution 2.802 7.232 5.136 6.483 -2.193 0.034 
Total phone lines 0.202 0.092 0.246 0.128 -2.125 0.040 
Home phone lines 0.162 0.076 0.199 0.106 -2.161 0.037 
Doctors 0.392 0.169 0.552 0.249 -3.971 0.000 
Commuting time 4.094 0.354 4.356 0.440 -3.667 0.001 
Crime rate 23.901 15.428 20.140 8.793 2.517 0.015 
Morbidity rate 0.698 0.119 0.711 0.107 -0.749 0.458 
Capital city 0.079 0.269 0.385 0.493 -3.853 0.000 
Ethnic-political risk 1.650 2.158 1.514 1.497 0.543 0.590 
Government regional wage coeffs. 1.207 0.012 1.158 0.043 1.112 0.272 
 
Note:  The t-statistics show the results of two-sample t test with unequal variances on the equality of means. 
 
Appendix 2: Commuting Time Equation, RLMS Cities, 1994-1996, 1998  
 
OLS Coeff. t Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent variable –        
Hours of commuting time per week   5.185 4.492 0 75 
Female -0.792 -9.44 0.508 0.500 0 1 
Age -0.005 -1.29 39.455 12.100 14 82 
Years of schooling 0.065 3.83 12.015 2.587 0 18 
Available public transportation       
Only buses (omitted)   0.361 0.480 0 1 
Trams and trolley buses 0.729 5.87 0.458 0.498 0 1 
Subway 1.128 5.96 0.181 0.385 0 1 
Route length 0.032 1.99 10.193 2.603 4.58 23.60 
Number of passengers / 100 0.043 1.69 4.525 2.892 0.04 11.26 
Number of public vehicles -0.417 -2.55 0.920 0.355 0.08 1.68 
Constant 3.856 11.72     
N=11322 F(11, 11310) = 22.92   R2 = 0.024 
 
Notes: Year dummies are included for three of the four years.  The t-statistics are defined with robust standard errors.  The 
sample is limited to the 39 cities included in the RLMS for the years in which the commuting question was asked. 
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Appendix 3:  Housing Value Equation with City Amenities, 2000  
(Heckman ML Model with Sample Selection and Clustering) 
 
 Main Regression Selection Equation 
 Coeff. z Coeff. z 
Characteristics of the Reference Person in a Household 
Female … … 0.095 1.15 
Age … … -0.014 -6.04 
Years of schooling … … 0.041 4.35 
Computer skills … … 0.341 3.55 
Housing Characteristics 
Living space 0.027 14.28 0.005 1.65 
Share of non-living space 1.171 5.50 0.665 2.77 
Privatized housing 0.024 0.76 0.212 3.07 
Central heating 0.059 0.71 -0.082 -0.49 
Central water supply 0.101 1.73 0.304 2.16 
Hot water supply 0.208 3.66 -0.033 -0.27 
Piped gas 0.155 2.33 -0.027 -0.25 
Central sewerage 0.146 1.52 -0.078 -0.45 
Home phone 0.176 4.97 -0.004 -0.05 
Amenities/Disamenities 
Heating degree days / 100 (cold) -0.002 -0.73 0.002 0.39 
Total precipitation / 100 0.000 0.24 -0.001 -1.41 
Air pollution -0.010 -1.11 0.019 0.94 
Water pollution 0.030 4.15 -0.012 -0.97 
Home phone lines -0.433 -0.88 -1.134 -1.73 
Doctors -0.558 -3.35 -0.287 -0.72 
Commuting time 0.497 2.86 -0.332 -1.56 
Crime rate 0.005 0.76 0.002 0.21 
Morbidity rate 0.291 0.69 -1.137 -2.21 
Capital city 0.045 0.26 0.322 1.05 
Ethnic-political risk 0.047 2.56 -0.017 -0.39 
Disequilibrium Variables 
Share of loss-making firms -2.561 -3.55 0.498 0.73 
Employment change 2.632 2.09 5.673 1.91 
Constant 8.949 9.98 2.768 2.08 
λ   -0.145 -1.19 
N = 2331; censored obs. = 844; uncensored obs. =1487 (non-missing reports on housing value) 
Wald test of independent equations: chi2(1) = 1.4 
 
Notes: Dependent variable is log of housing market value, rubles; sample size is restricted to households-occupants 
of own houses living in cities; t-statistics are defined with robust clustered standard errors allowing for correlation 
within 39 cities. 
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Figure 1:  Government Regional Wage Coefficients, 2000 
 
# #
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
Samara
Moskva
MagadanYakutsk
Novosibirsk
Vladivostok
Yekaterinburg
Saint Petersburg
1 - 1. 15
1. 15 - 1. 53
1. 53 - 1. 82
1. 82 - 2. 33
2. 33 - 3
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Figure 2:  Average City Wages and Housing Prices in 39 RLMS Cities, 2000 
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Notes:  The outlier in housing prices is Moscow.  Three outliers in wages are northern cities in oil-producing fields.   
Names of all of the cities cannot be disclosed due to confidentiality.
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Figure 3:  Quality of Life Index Values by Region in the Russian Federation, 2000 
# #
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
Samara
Moskva
MagadanYakutsk
Novosibirsk
Vladivostok
Yekaterinburg
Saint Petersburg
176 - 190
190 - 204
204 - 218
218 - 232
232 - 246
 
 
